University of Hertfordshire

By the same authors

Documents

  • 906919

    Final published version, 503 KB, PDF document

View graph of relations
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-25
Number of pages25
JournalGames
Volume5
Issue1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 30 Jan 2014

Abstract

The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a distinct type: spontaneous agents, rigid players, and 'satisficers'. We use simulations to examine the performance of these types. Agents who change their strategies relatively easily tend to perform better in coordination games, but antagonistic games generally lead to more favorable outcomes if the individuals only change their strategies when disappointment from previous rounds surpasses some predefined threshold.

Notes

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited

ID: 7635552