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It Takes More than Moore to Answer Existence-Questions

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It Takes More than Moore to Answer Existence-Questions. / Egerton, Karl.

In: Erkenntnis, 18.02.2019.

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@article{875f6cbe7fa84d57b5cf07fc12983755,
title = "It Takes More than Moore to Answer Existence-Questions",
abstract = "Several recent discussions of metaphysics disavow existence-questions, claiming that they are metaphysically uninteresting because trivially settled in the affirmative by Moorean facts. This is often given as a reason to focus metaphysical debate instead on questions of grounding. I argue that the strategy employed to undermine existence-questions fails against its usual target: Quineanism. The Quinean can protest that the formulation given of their position is a straw man: properly understood, as a project of explication, Quinean metaphysics does not counsel us to choose between obvious ordinary-language claims and absurd revisionist claims, even if appeal to Moorean facts is permitted.",
author = "Karl Egerton",
note = "{\textcopyright} 2019 Springer Nature. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Erkenntnis. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00107-4",
year = "2019",
month = feb,
day = "18",
doi = "10.1007/s10670-019-00107-4",
language = "English",
journal = "Erkenntnis",
issn = "0165-0106",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - It Takes More than Moore to Answer Existence-Questions

AU - Egerton, Karl

N1 - © 2019 Springer Nature. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Erkenntnis. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00107-4

PY - 2019/2/18

Y1 - 2019/2/18

N2 - Several recent discussions of metaphysics disavow existence-questions, claiming that they are metaphysically uninteresting because trivially settled in the affirmative by Moorean facts. This is often given as a reason to focus metaphysical debate instead on questions of grounding. I argue that the strategy employed to undermine existence-questions fails against its usual target: Quineanism. The Quinean can protest that the formulation given of their position is a straw man: properly understood, as a project of explication, Quinean metaphysics does not counsel us to choose between obvious ordinary-language claims and absurd revisionist claims, even if appeal to Moorean facts is permitted.

AB - Several recent discussions of metaphysics disavow existence-questions, claiming that they are metaphysically uninteresting because trivially settled in the affirmative by Moorean facts. This is often given as a reason to focus metaphysical debate instead on questions of grounding. I argue that the strategy employed to undermine existence-questions fails against its usual target: Quineanism. The Quinean can protest that the formulation given of their position is a straw man: properly understood, as a project of explication, Quinean metaphysics does not counsel us to choose between obvious ordinary-language claims and absurd revisionist claims, even if appeal to Moorean facts is permitted.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85061733598&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10670-019-00107-4

DO - 10.1007/s10670-019-00107-4

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85061733598

JO - Erkenntnis

JF - Erkenntnis

SN - 0165-0106

ER -