University of Hertfordshire

By the same authors

Painfulness, Suffering, and Consciousness

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Standard

Painfulness, Suffering, and Consciousness. / Coleman, Sam.

Philosophy of Suffering: Metaphysics, Value, and Normativity. ed. / David Bain; Michael Brady; Jennifer Corns. Routledge, 2019.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Harvard

Coleman, S 2019, Painfulness, Suffering, and Consciousness. in D Bain, MB & J Corns (eds), Philosophy of Suffering: Metaphysics, Value, and Normativity. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351115469-4

APA

Coleman, S. (2019). Painfulness, Suffering, and Consciousness. In D. Bain, M. B., & J. Corns (Eds.), Philosophy of Suffering: Metaphysics, Value, and Normativity Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351115469-4

Vancouver

Coleman S. Painfulness, Suffering, and Consciousness. In Bain D, MB, Corns J, editors, Philosophy of Suffering: Metaphysics, Value, and Normativity. Routledge. 2019 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351115469-4

Author

Coleman, Sam. / Painfulness, Suffering, and Consciousness. Philosophy of Suffering: Metaphysics, Value, and Normativity. editor / David Bain ; Michael Brady ; Jennifer Corns. Routledge, 2019.

Bibtex

@inbook{2ff1a0dd434f4d0cae135cd1118a3642,
title = "Painfulness, Suffering, and Consciousness",
abstract = "The popular view on which unpleasant pain consists of two dissociable components, and on which there may be pains that wholly lack affect, is the product of a theoretical deference to consciousness. The same is true of the thesis that suffering is exclusively a conscious phenomenon. Pain researchers defer to consciousness, but in my view they do not properly heed its message regarding pain, painfulness, and suffering. I will argue that consciousness actually gives us a double-edged message about these phenomena. Introspection reveals pain and painfulness to be essentially kinds of qualia, or qualitative character, (§1)—a thesis I defend from the {\textquoteleft}heterogeneity problem{\textquoteright} (§2). But introspection also prompts a conception of pain and painfulness on which these are capable in principle of unconscious existence (§3, §5). This implies, in turn, that suffering may well occur unconsciously (§§4-5), something I argue for in part by criticising rival models of suffering (§4). Taking consciousness seriously as an epistemic source for the natures of pain, painfulness, and suffering, thus has the surprising result that consciousness is removed from the metaphysics of pain, painfulness, and suffering.",
author = "Sam Coleman",
year = "2019",
month = oct,
day = "2",
doi = "10.4324/9781351115469-4",
language = "English",
isbn = "9780815361787",
editor = "Bain, {David } and {Michael Brady} and Jennifer Corns",
booktitle = "Philosophy of Suffering",
publisher = "Routledge",
address = "United Kingdom",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Painfulness, Suffering, and Consciousness

AU - Coleman, Sam

PY - 2019/10/2

Y1 - 2019/10/2

N2 - The popular view on which unpleasant pain consists of two dissociable components, and on which there may be pains that wholly lack affect, is the product of a theoretical deference to consciousness. The same is true of the thesis that suffering is exclusively a conscious phenomenon. Pain researchers defer to consciousness, but in my view they do not properly heed its message regarding pain, painfulness, and suffering. I will argue that consciousness actually gives us a double-edged message about these phenomena. Introspection reveals pain and painfulness to be essentially kinds of qualia, or qualitative character, (§1)—a thesis I defend from the ‘heterogeneity problem’ (§2). But introspection also prompts a conception of pain and painfulness on which these are capable in principle of unconscious existence (§3, §5). This implies, in turn, that suffering may well occur unconsciously (§§4-5), something I argue for in part by criticising rival models of suffering (§4). Taking consciousness seriously as an epistemic source for the natures of pain, painfulness, and suffering, thus has the surprising result that consciousness is removed from the metaphysics of pain, painfulness, and suffering.

AB - The popular view on which unpleasant pain consists of two dissociable components, and on which there may be pains that wholly lack affect, is the product of a theoretical deference to consciousness. The same is true of the thesis that suffering is exclusively a conscious phenomenon. Pain researchers defer to consciousness, but in my view they do not properly heed its message regarding pain, painfulness, and suffering. I will argue that consciousness actually gives us a double-edged message about these phenomena. Introspection reveals pain and painfulness to be essentially kinds of qualia, or qualitative character, (§1)—a thesis I defend from the ‘heterogeneity problem’ (§2). But introspection also prompts a conception of pain and painfulness on which these are capable in principle of unconscious existence (§3, §5). This implies, in turn, that suffering may well occur unconsciously (§§4-5), something I argue for in part by criticising rival models of suffering (§4). Taking consciousness seriously as an epistemic source for the natures of pain, painfulness, and suffering, thus has the surprising result that consciousness is removed from the metaphysics of pain, painfulness, and suffering.

U2 - 10.4324/9781351115469-4

DO - 10.4324/9781351115469-4

M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

SN - 9780815361787

BT - Philosophy of Suffering

A2 - Bain, David

A2 - null, Michael Brady

A2 - Corns, Jennifer

PB - Routledge

ER -