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Period and Place: Collingwood and Wittgenstein on Understanding Others

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Period and Place: Collingwood and Wittgenstein on Understanding Others. / Sandis, Constantine.

In: Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, 01.01.2016, p. 167-193.

Research output: Contribution to journalSpecial issuepeer-review

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@article{7533321f7d31420c8606698782856cf1,
title = "Period and Place:: Collingwood and Wittgenstein on Understanding Others",
abstract = "What it takes to understand radically different others lies at the heart of the philosophies developed by Collingwood and Wittgenstein at roughly the same time. Their approaches contain three differences of focus that are prima facie significant: (i) period vs. place; (ii) individual vs. collective; (iii) re-enactment vs. forms of life. In this essay I demonstrate that these are little more than a divergence in emphasis and thatwemust view their approaches as complimentary, rather than opposed. This this is not a simple case of reaching the same conclusions through different, let alone incompatible, routes. Far from it. The two philosophers use similar methods and reason in similar ways when considering the relation of thought to action, and of both thought and action to explanation and understanding. This is particularly remarkable given that the two thinkers are often thought to stand at opposite ends of the methodological spectrum with respect to the value of metaphysics.",
author = "Constantine Sandis",
note = "This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: C. Sandis, {\textquoteleft}Period and Place: Collingwood and Wittgenstein on Understanding Others{\textquoteright}, Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, Vol 22 (1): 167-193, January 2016. The Version of Record is available online at: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/imp/col/2016/00000022/00000001/art00008.",
year = "2016",
month = jan,
day = "1",
language = "English",
volume = "22",
pages = "167--193",
journal = "Collingwood and British Idealism Studies",
issn = "1744-9413",
publisher = "Imprint Academic",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Period and Place:

T2 - Collingwood and Wittgenstein on Understanding Others

AU - Sandis, Constantine

N1 - This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: C. Sandis, ‘Period and Place: Collingwood and Wittgenstein on Understanding Others’, Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, Vol 22 (1): 167-193, January 2016. The Version of Record is available online at: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/imp/col/2016/00000022/00000001/art00008.

PY - 2016/1/1

Y1 - 2016/1/1

N2 - What it takes to understand radically different others lies at the heart of the philosophies developed by Collingwood and Wittgenstein at roughly the same time. Their approaches contain three differences of focus that are prima facie significant: (i) period vs. place; (ii) individual vs. collective; (iii) re-enactment vs. forms of life. In this essay I demonstrate that these are little more than a divergence in emphasis and thatwemust view their approaches as complimentary, rather than opposed. This this is not a simple case of reaching the same conclusions through different, let alone incompatible, routes. Far from it. The two philosophers use similar methods and reason in similar ways when considering the relation of thought to action, and of both thought and action to explanation and understanding. This is particularly remarkable given that the two thinkers are often thought to stand at opposite ends of the methodological spectrum with respect to the value of metaphysics.

AB - What it takes to understand radically different others lies at the heart of the philosophies developed by Collingwood and Wittgenstein at roughly the same time. Their approaches contain three differences of focus that are prima facie significant: (i) period vs. place; (ii) individual vs. collective; (iii) re-enactment vs. forms of life. In this essay I demonstrate that these are little more than a divergence in emphasis and thatwemust view their approaches as complimentary, rather than opposed. This this is not a simple case of reaching the same conclusions through different, let alone incompatible, routes. Far from it. The two philosophers use similar methods and reason in similar ways when considering the relation of thought to action, and of both thought and action to explanation and understanding. This is particularly remarkable given that the two thinkers are often thought to stand at opposite ends of the methodological spectrum with respect to the value of metaphysics.

M3 - Special issue

VL - 22

SP - 167

EP - 193

JO - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies

JF - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies

SN - 1744-9413

IS - 1

ER -