University of Hertfordshire

By the same authors

Resilient Tit-For-Tat (RTFT): A Game Solution For Wireless Misbehaviour

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Standard

Resilient Tit-For-Tat (RTFT) : A Game Solution For Wireless Misbehaviour. / Abegunde, Jacob; Xiao, Hannan; Spring, Joseph.

Procs 11th Int Wireless Communication & Mobile Computing Conference. IEEE, 2015.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Harvard

Abegunde, J, Xiao, H & Spring, J 2015, Resilient Tit-For-Tat (RTFT): A Game Solution For Wireless Misbehaviour. in Procs 11th Int Wireless Communication & Mobile Computing Conference. IEEE, 11th International Wireless Communication & Mobile Computing Conference, Dubrovnik , Croatia, 24/08/15.

APA

Abegunde, J., Xiao, H., & Spring, J. (2015). Resilient Tit-For-Tat (RTFT): A Game Solution For Wireless Misbehaviour. In Procs 11th Int Wireless Communication & Mobile Computing Conference IEEE.

Vancouver

Abegunde J, Xiao H, Spring J. Resilient Tit-For-Tat (RTFT): A Game Solution For Wireless Misbehaviour. In Procs 11th Int Wireless Communication & Mobile Computing Conference. IEEE. 2015

Author

Abegunde, Jacob ; Xiao, Hannan ; Spring, Joseph. / Resilient Tit-For-Tat (RTFT) : A Game Solution For Wireless Misbehaviour. Procs 11th Int Wireless Communication & Mobile Computing Conference. IEEE, 2015.

Bibtex

@inproceedings{85a91a3afc164df4a7ccb981456cbf0e,
title = "Resilient Tit-For-Tat (RTFT): A Game Solution For Wireless Misbehaviour",
abstract = "The vulnerability of wireless networks to selfish and misbehaving nodes is a well known problem. The TitFor-Tat (TFT) strategy has been proposed as a game theoretic solution to the problem, however the TFT suffers from a deadlockvulnerability. We present a modified TFT algorithm, the Resilient Tit-For-Tat (RTFT) algorithm in which we introduce the concept of alternative strategies to complement the default strategy. This combination enables us to model a non-cooperative game in which nodes are able change their strategies in order to maximize their utilities in selfish and misbehaviour scenarios. We demonstratethe viability of our proposal through the use of simulations",
author = "Jacob Abegunde and Hannan Xiao and Joseph Spring",
year = "2015",
month = aug,
language = "English",
isbn = "978-1-4799-5344-8",
booktitle = "Procs 11th Int Wireless Communication & Mobile Computing Conference",
publisher = "IEEE",
note = "11th International Wireless Communication & Mobile Computing Conference ; Conference date: 24-08-2015 Through 28-08-2015",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Resilient Tit-For-Tat (RTFT)

T2 - 11th International Wireless Communication & Mobile Computing Conference

AU - Abegunde, Jacob

AU - Xiao, Hannan

AU - Spring, Joseph

PY - 2015/8

Y1 - 2015/8

N2 - The vulnerability of wireless networks to selfish and misbehaving nodes is a well known problem. The TitFor-Tat (TFT) strategy has been proposed as a game theoretic solution to the problem, however the TFT suffers from a deadlockvulnerability. We present a modified TFT algorithm, the Resilient Tit-For-Tat (RTFT) algorithm in which we introduce the concept of alternative strategies to complement the default strategy. This combination enables us to model a non-cooperative game in which nodes are able change their strategies in order to maximize their utilities in selfish and misbehaviour scenarios. We demonstratethe viability of our proposal through the use of simulations

AB - The vulnerability of wireless networks to selfish and misbehaving nodes is a well known problem. The TitFor-Tat (TFT) strategy has been proposed as a game theoretic solution to the problem, however the TFT suffers from a deadlockvulnerability. We present a modified TFT algorithm, the Resilient Tit-For-Tat (RTFT) algorithm in which we introduce the concept of alternative strategies to complement the default strategy. This combination enables us to model a non-cooperative game in which nodes are able change their strategies in order to maximize their utilities in selfish and misbehaviour scenarios. We demonstratethe viability of our proposal through the use of simulations

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 978-1-4799-5344-8

BT - Procs 11th Int Wireless Communication & Mobile Computing Conference

PB - IEEE

Y2 - 24 August 2015 through 28 August 2015

ER -