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Russellian Monism and Mental Causation

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Russellian Monism and Mental Causation. / Coleman, Sam; Alter, Torin.

In: Noûs, Vol. 2019, 12318, 22.10.2019.

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Coleman, Sam ; Alter, Torin. / Russellian Monism and Mental Causation. In: Noûs. 2019 ; Vol. 2019.

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@article{fe96a9a0b28e4fc8891755f53538712e,
title = "Russellian Monism and Mental Causation",
abstract = "According to Russellian monism, consciousness is constituted at least partly by quiddities: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. If the theory is true, then consciousness and such dispositional properties are closely connected. But how closely? The contingency thesis says that the connection is contingent. For example, on this thesis the dispositional property associated with negative charge might have been categorically grounded by a quiddity that is distinct from the one that actually grounds it. Some argue that Russellian monism entails the contingency thesis and that this makes its consciousness‐constituting quiddities epiphenomenal—a disastrous outcome for a theory that is motivated partly by its prospects for integrating consciousness into physical causation. We consider two versions of that argument, a generic version and an intriguing version developed by Robert J. Howell, which he bases on Jaegwon Kim's well‐known “exclusion argument.” We argue that neither succeeds.",
author = "Sam Coleman and Torin Alter",
note = "{\textcopyright} 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.",
year = "2019",
month = oct,
day = "22",
doi = "10.1111/nous.12318",
language = "English",
volume = "2019",
journal = "No{\^u}s",
issn = "0029-4624",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Russellian Monism and Mental Causation

AU - Coleman, Sam

AU - Alter, Torin

N1 - © 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

PY - 2019/10/22

Y1 - 2019/10/22

N2 - According to Russellian monism, consciousness is constituted at least partly by quiddities: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. If the theory is true, then consciousness and such dispositional properties are closely connected. But how closely? The contingency thesis says that the connection is contingent. For example, on this thesis the dispositional property associated with negative charge might have been categorically grounded by a quiddity that is distinct from the one that actually grounds it. Some argue that Russellian monism entails the contingency thesis and that this makes its consciousness‐constituting quiddities epiphenomenal—a disastrous outcome for a theory that is motivated partly by its prospects for integrating consciousness into physical causation. We consider two versions of that argument, a generic version and an intriguing version developed by Robert J. Howell, which he bases on Jaegwon Kim's well‐known “exclusion argument.” We argue that neither succeeds.

AB - According to Russellian monism, consciousness is constituted at least partly by quiddities: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. If the theory is true, then consciousness and such dispositional properties are closely connected. But how closely? The contingency thesis says that the connection is contingent. For example, on this thesis the dispositional property associated with negative charge might have been categorically grounded by a quiddity that is distinct from the one that actually grounds it. Some argue that Russellian monism entails the contingency thesis and that this makes its consciousness‐constituting quiddities epiphenomenal—a disastrous outcome for a theory that is motivated partly by its prospects for integrating consciousness into physical causation. We consider two versions of that argument, a generic version and an intriguing version developed by Robert J. Howell, which he bases on Jaegwon Kim's well‐known “exclusion argument.” We argue that neither succeeds.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85074608936&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/nous.12318

DO - 10.1111/nous.12318

M3 - Article

VL - 2019

JO - Noûs

JF - Noûs

SN - 0029-4624

M1 - 12318

ER -