University of Hertfordshire

By the same authors

The Doing and the Deed: Action in Normative Ethics

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Standard

The Doing and the Deed : Action in Normative Ethics. / Sandis, Constantine.

Philosophy of Action. ed. / Anthony O'Hear. Vol. 80 Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2017. (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements; Vol. 80).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Harvard

Sandis, C 2017, The Doing and the Deed: Action in Normative Ethics. in A O'Hear (ed.), Philosophy of Action. vol. 80, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, vol. 80, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

APA

Sandis, C. (2017). The Doing and the Deed: Action in Normative Ethics. In A. O'Hear (Ed.), Philosophy of Action (Vol. 80). (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements; Vol. 80). Cambridge University Press.

Vancouver

Sandis C. The Doing and the Deed: Action in Normative Ethics. In O'Hear A, editor, Philosophy of Action. Vol. 80. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2017. (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements).

Author

Sandis, Constantine. / The Doing and the Deed : Action in Normative Ethics. Philosophy of Action. editor / Anthony O'Hear. Vol. 80 Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2017. (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements).

Bibtex

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title = "The Doing and the Deed: Action in Normative Ethics",
abstract = "This essay is motivated by the thought that the things we do are to be distinguished from our acts of doing them. I defend a particular way of drawing this distinction before proceeding to demonstrate its relevance for normative ethics. Central to my argument is the conviction that certain ongoing debates in ethical theory begin to dissolve once we disambiguate the two concepts of action in question. If this is right, then the study of action should be accorded a far more prominent place within moral philosophy than previously supposed. I end by considering an extension of the above to aesthetic evaluation and, mutatis mutandis, that of our lives in general.",
keywords = "action, Ethics",
author = "Constantine Sandis",
note = "This material has been published in Philosophy of Action edited by Anthony O'Hear. This version is free to view and download for personal use only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. {\textcopyright} 2017 Selection and editorial matter, Anthony O{\textquoteright}Hear, individual chapters, the contributors. ",
year = "2017",
month = aug,
day = "24",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781108414890",
volume = "80",
series = "Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
editor = "Anthony O'Hear",
booktitle = "Philosophy of Action",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - The Doing and the Deed

T2 - Action in Normative Ethics

AU - Sandis, Constantine

N1 - This material has been published in Philosophy of Action edited by Anthony O'Hear. This version is free to view and download for personal use only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © 2017 Selection and editorial matter, Anthony O’Hear, individual chapters, the contributors.

PY - 2017/8/24

Y1 - 2017/8/24

N2 - This essay is motivated by the thought that the things we do are to be distinguished from our acts of doing them. I defend a particular way of drawing this distinction before proceeding to demonstrate its relevance for normative ethics. Central to my argument is the conviction that certain ongoing debates in ethical theory begin to dissolve once we disambiguate the two concepts of action in question. If this is right, then the study of action should be accorded a far more prominent place within moral philosophy than previously supposed. I end by considering an extension of the above to aesthetic evaluation and, mutatis mutandis, that of our lives in general.

AB - This essay is motivated by the thought that the things we do are to be distinguished from our acts of doing them. I defend a particular way of drawing this distinction before proceeding to demonstrate its relevance for normative ethics. Central to my argument is the conviction that certain ongoing debates in ethical theory begin to dissolve once we disambiguate the two concepts of action in question. If this is right, then the study of action should be accorded a far more prominent place within moral philosophy than previously supposed. I end by considering an extension of the above to aesthetic evaluation and, mutatis mutandis, that of our lives in general.

KW - action

KW - Ethics

UR - http://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-general-interest/philosophy-action?format=PB#XwxSykXLH1rDZ6YF.97

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9781108414890

VL - 80

T3 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements

BT - Philosophy of Action

A2 - O'Hear, Anthony

PB - Cambridge University Press

CY - Cambridge

ER -