University of Hertfordshire

From the same journal

The Earlier Wittgenstein on the Notion of Religious Attitude

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Standard

The Earlier Wittgenstein on the Notion of Religious Attitude. / Tejedor, Chon.

In: Philosophy, Vol. 88, No. 1, 01.2013, p. 55-79.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Author

Tejedor, Chon. / The Earlier Wittgenstein on the Notion of Religious Attitude. In: Philosophy. 2013 ; Vol. 88, No. 1. pp. 55-79.

Bibtex

@article{9571b532e3f446739b814ad5cee92edf,
title = "The Earlier Wittgenstein on the Notion of Religious Attitude",
abstract = "I defend a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's notion of religious (or ethical) attitude in the Tractatus, one that rejects three key views from the secondary literature: firstly, the view that, for Wittgenstein, the willing subject is a transcendental condition for the religious attitude; secondly, the view that the religious attitude is an emotive response to the world or something closely modelled on this notion of emotive response; and thirdly, the view that, although the religious and ethical pseudo-propositions of the Tractatus are nonsensical, they nevertheless succeed in expressing the religious attitude endorsed by Wittgenstein. In connection to the first, I argue that the notion of willing subject as transcendental condition is abandoned by Wittgenstein in the Notebooks and is no longer a feature of his position in the Tractatus. In connection to the second, I argue that the religious attitude is dispositional rather than emotive for Wittgenstein: it is a disposition to use signs in a way that demonstrates one's conceptual clarity. Finally, in connection to the third, I argue that the religious or ethical attitude is strongly ineffable in that it cannot be described, expressed or conveyed by language at all.",
author = "Chon Tejedor",
year = "2013",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1017/S0031819112000538",
language = "English",
volume = "88",
pages = "55--79",
journal = "Philosophy",
issn = "0031-8191",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Earlier Wittgenstein on the Notion of Religious Attitude

AU - Tejedor, Chon

PY - 2013/1

Y1 - 2013/1

N2 - I defend a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's notion of religious (or ethical) attitude in the Tractatus, one that rejects three key views from the secondary literature: firstly, the view that, for Wittgenstein, the willing subject is a transcendental condition for the religious attitude; secondly, the view that the religious attitude is an emotive response to the world or something closely modelled on this notion of emotive response; and thirdly, the view that, although the religious and ethical pseudo-propositions of the Tractatus are nonsensical, they nevertheless succeed in expressing the religious attitude endorsed by Wittgenstein. In connection to the first, I argue that the notion of willing subject as transcendental condition is abandoned by Wittgenstein in the Notebooks and is no longer a feature of his position in the Tractatus. In connection to the second, I argue that the religious attitude is dispositional rather than emotive for Wittgenstein: it is a disposition to use signs in a way that demonstrates one's conceptual clarity. Finally, in connection to the third, I argue that the religious or ethical attitude is strongly ineffable in that it cannot be described, expressed or conveyed by language at all.

AB - I defend a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's notion of religious (or ethical) attitude in the Tractatus, one that rejects three key views from the secondary literature: firstly, the view that, for Wittgenstein, the willing subject is a transcendental condition for the religious attitude; secondly, the view that the religious attitude is an emotive response to the world or something closely modelled on this notion of emotive response; and thirdly, the view that, although the religious and ethical pseudo-propositions of the Tractatus are nonsensical, they nevertheless succeed in expressing the religious attitude endorsed by Wittgenstein. In connection to the first, I argue that the notion of willing subject as transcendental condition is abandoned by Wittgenstein in the Notebooks and is no longer a feature of his position in the Tractatus. In connection to the second, I argue that the religious attitude is dispositional rather than emotive for Wittgenstein: it is a disposition to use signs in a way that demonstrates one's conceptual clarity. Finally, in connection to the third, I argue that the religious or ethical attitude is strongly ineffable in that it cannot be described, expressed or conveyed by language at all.

U2 - 10.1017/S0031819112000538

DO - 10.1017/S0031819112000538

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84872196021

VL - 88

SP - 55

EP - 79

JO - Philosophy

JF - Philosophy

SN - 0031-8191

IS - 1

ER -