University of Hertfordshire

From the same journal

The logic of 'being informed' revisited and revised

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  • P. Allo
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Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)417-434
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume153
Issue3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Abstract

The logic of 'being informed' gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.

Notes

“The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com” Copyright Springer

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