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The logic of 'being informed' revisited and revised

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The logic of 'being informed' revisited and revised. / Allo, P.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 153, No. 3, 2011, p. 417-434.

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Allo, P. / The logic of 'being informed' revisited and revised. In: Philosophical Studies. 2011 ; Vol. 153, No. 3. pp. 417-434.

Bibtex

@article{c3262ec2c2c240219e5981ccc8fef790,
title = "The logic of 'being informed' revisited and revised",
abstract = "The logic of 'being informed' gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.",
author = "P. Allo",
note = "“The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com” Copyright Springer",
year = "2011",
doi = "10.1007/s11098-010-9516-1",
language = "English",
volume = "153",
pages = "417--434",
journal = "Philosophical Studies",
issn = "0031-8116",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "3",

}

RIS

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T1 - The logic of 'being informed' revisited and revised

AU - Allo, P.

N1 - “The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com” Copyright Springer

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - The logic of 'being informed' gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.

AB - The logic of 'being informed' gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.

U2 - 10.1007/s11098-010-9516-1

DO - 10.1007/s11098-010-9516-1

M3 - Article

VL - 153

SP - 417

EP - 434

JO - Philosophical Studies

JF - Philosophical Studies

SN - 0031-8116

IS - 3

ER -