University of Hertfordshire

From the same journal

The narrative practice hypothesis: origins and applications of folk psychology

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


  • D. Hutto
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Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)43-68
JournalRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplements
Publication statusPublished - 2007


Psychologically normal adult humans make sense of intentional actions by trying to decide for which reason they were performed. This is a datum that requires our understanding. Although there have been interesting recent debates about how we should understand ‘reasons’, I will follow a long tradition and assume that, at a bare minimum, to act for a reason involves having appropriately interrelated beliefs and desires.


The original article can be found at: The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors & Cambridge University Press DOI : 10.1017/S1358246107000033

ID: 187623