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| Original language | English |
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| Number of pages | 17 |
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| Journal | Journal of Common Market Studies |
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| Early online date | 10 Mar 2021 |
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| DOIs | |
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| Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 10 Mar 2021 |
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Abstract
The European Commission has been active in proposing legislation on the exchange of information on Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) in the field of energy, pushing for an ex ante control mechanism which most member states have been reluctant to accept. This article aims to explain the extent to which and the conditions under which the Commission has been able to achieve its IGAs objectives. It argues that they have been achieved to a considerable extent due to the ability of the Commission to build on its agenda‐setting powers and the preference alignment of member states. The article offers a thorough analysis of two consecutive legislative processes: the first leading to Decision 994/2012 and the second repealing the former and leading to Decision 2017/684. The analysis builds on legislative documents, secondary sources and data collected during two rounds of interviews in 2013 and 2018.
Notes
© 2021 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is the accepted manuscript version of an article which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13129
ID: 22426482