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Virtue Ethics and Particularism

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Virtue Ethics and Particularism. / Sandis, Constantine.

In: Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Vol. 95, No. 1, 01.07.2021, p. 205-232.

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@article{3c2eae50e37648369fb6ec43108b81f6,
title = "Virtue Ethics and Particularism",
abstract = "Moral particularism is often conceived as the view that there are no moral principles. However, its most f{\^e}ted accounts focus almost exclusively on rules regarding actions and their features. Such action-centred particularism, I argue, is compatible with generalism at the level of character traits. The resulting view is a form of particularist virtue ethics. This endorses directives of the form {\textquoteleft}be X{\textquoteright} but rejects any implication that the relevant x-ness must therefore always count in favour of an action.",
author = "Constantine Sandis",
year = "2021",
month = jul,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1093/arisup/akab013",
language = "English",
volume = "95",
pages = "205--232",
journal = "Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume",
issn = "0309-7013",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Virtue Ethics and Particularism

AU - Sandis, Constantine

PY - 2021/7/1

Y1 - 2021/7/1

N2 - Moral particularism is often conceived as the view that there are no moral principles. However, its most fêted accounts focus almost exclusively on rules regarding actions and their features. Such action-centred particularism, I argue, is compatible with generalism at the level of character traits. The resulting view is a form of particularist virtue ethics. This endorses directives of the form ‘be X’ but rejects any implication that the relevant x-ness must therefore always count in favour of an action.

AB - Moral particularism is often conceived as the view that there are no moral principles. However, its most fêted accounts focus almost exclusively on rules regarding actions and their features. Such action-centred particularism, I argue, is compatible with generalism at the level of character traits. The resulting view is a form of particularist virtue ethics. This endorses directives of the form ‘be X’ but rejects any implication that the relevant x-ness must therefore always count in favour of an action.

U2 - 10.1093/arisup/akab013

DO - 10.1093/arisup/akab013

M3 - Article

VL - 95

SP - 205

EP - 232

JO - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

JF - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

SN - 0309-7013

IS - 1

ER -