Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Virtue Ethics and Particularism. / Sandis, Constantine.
In: Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Vol. 95, No. 1, 01.07.2021, p. 205-232.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Virtue Ethics and Particularism
AU - Sandis, Constantine
PY - 2021/7/1
Y1 - 2021/7/1
N2 - Moral particularism is often conceived as the view that there are no moral principles. However, its most fêted accounts focus almost exclusively on rules regarding actions and their features. Such action-centred particularism, I argue, is compatible with generalism at the level of character traits. The resulting view is a form of particularist virtue ethics. This endorses directives of the form ‘be X’ but rejects any implication that the relevant x-ness must therefore always count in favour of an action.
AB - Moral particularism is often conceived as the view that there are no moral principles. However, its most fêted accounts focus almost exclusively on rules regarding actions and their features. Such action-centred particularism, I argue, is compatible with generalism at the level of character traits. The resulting view is a form of particularist virtue ethics. This endorses directives of the form ‘be X’ but rejects any implication that the relevant x-ness must therefore always count in favour of an action.
U2 - 10.1093/arisup/akab013
DO - 10.1093/arisup/akab013
M3 - Article
VL - 95
SP - 205
EP - 232
JO - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
JF - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
SN - 0309-7013
IS - 1
ER -