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Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)401–404
Number of pages3
JournalPhilosophia Mathematica
Volume24
Issue3
Early online date7 Jul 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2016

Abstract

The view that a mathematical proof is a sketch of or recipe for a formal derivation requires the proof to function as an argument that there is a suitable derivation. This is a mathematical conclusion, and to avoid a regress we require some other account of how the proof can establish it.

Notes

This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Philosophia Mathematica following peer review. Under embargo. Embargo end date: 7 July 2018 The version of record [Lavor, B., 'Why the Naive Derivation Recipe Model Cannot Explain How Mathematician's Proofs Secure Mathematical Knowledge', Philosophia Mathematica (2016) 24(3): 401-404, is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkw012. © The Author [2016]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

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