Prologue

‘I could only stare in wonder at Shakespeare; never do anything with him’, writes Wittgenstein in *Culture and Value*.¹ This is not because he understands Shakespeare but has no instrumental use for him. Rather, Shakespeare doesn’t *speak* to him anymore than a talking lion would. Whatever is happening in Shakespeare, Wittgenstein claims to not really get it. The confession is not a criticism of either Shakespeare or himself, but a statement of aesthetic alienation. The Elizabethan playwright is an enigma to the 20th century Austrian philosopher²:

> [O]ne human being can be a complete enigma to another. One learns this when one comes into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even though one has mastered the country’s language. One does not *understand* the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We can’t find our feet with them.³

The failure to understand Shakespeare *qua* artist is akin (though by no means identical) to the failure to understand him *qua* person. *Mutatis mutandis*, the failure to understand an artist’s works is akin to the failure to understand a person’s actions. This is not because

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² For Wittgenstein’s interest in geographical as opposed to historical distance in cultural understanding see Sandis (2016b).
³ Wittgenstein (1953: 471, §325).
artworks are actions, but because both are things that we produce intentionally, with varying degrees of success.\footnote{See § 4.}

What – if anything at all – is it to understand a play, a symphony, or a sculpture? What does getting it or not getting it amount to? Grasping failures are not a matter of being left out of some kind of secret fact (phenomenological or otherwise), as in Wrede's *The Messianic Secret*.\footnote{Wrede (1901).} Rather, they are like the tortoise's failure to understand what it is for one thing to logically follow another. 'Whatever Logic is good enough to tell me is worth writing down', says the Tortoise to Achilles.\footnote{Carroll (1895).} Yet his understanding of whatever Achilles writes down falls perilously short of understanding what is going on when he does so.

Just as understanding a person is not a matter of understanding what she is saying, so understanding a work of art is not a matter of understand what it is saying, assuming it is saying anything at all. Wittgenstein might understand the words of Shakespeare's texts, yet fail to understand the works themselves. Must this amount to a failure to understand what Shakespeare is saying or doing? The question is too ambiguous to merit an answer without due clarification. But this much is true: you might understand what I am saying, yet fail to understand me because you cannot fathom why I would say it. If so, my writing will not speak to you. Two people may be speaking to each other without either speaking to the other in this metaphorical sense.

What I tell you may either help you to understand me or stand as an obstacle to this, intentionally or otherwise. By the same token, understanding me may both help you to understand what I am saying, or impair you from doing so (e.g. if I am speaking out of character). An artwork may similarly both reveal and obscure the artist, and be revealed or obscured by her. The analogy is trickier to maintain with non-linguistic art, but the temptation to think that art always contains some idea to be understood viz. that all art is ultimately conceptual, runs deep. I wish to steer us away from this temptation, without entirely abandoning the idea that the appreciation of art can involve a kind of 'getting it'.

I. **Understanding Art**
in his paper ‘Art and Philosophy’, Wittgenstein’s student and friend Rush Rhees draws analogies between grasping a work of art and philosophical understanding. In both cases, he claims, the person seeking understanding is not at all interested how a certain notation – e.g. a string of words or musical notes - is being used. While allowing that what is said in one form of art is impossible to say in another, Rhees nonetheless holds that ‘to understand a painting or a poem or a song is to understand its ideas (to grasp it).’ I hope to demonstrate how this view is indicative of a troubling failure to grasp what art even is.

There have been numerous analogies between art and language. Without altogether rejecting the possibility of seeing art as language, Garry Hagberg warns that these analogies are only ever as good (usually as bad) as the model of language one is working with in the first place. If one's theory of linguistic meaning in misguided, the analogy will give rise to highly distorted views of art. Hagberg is equally skeptical about the very question of what it is for a work of art to have meaning, at least under a popular understanding of it:

The question what is the meaning of a work of art, where "meaning" carries and implicit analogy with language and where in turn language implies a fundamental separability of meaning from materials, is a question that ought to be treated with extreme caution.

He explicates:

If an entity of a suspiciously ill-defined metaphysical nature is presumed to exist as the meaning of a work, aesthetic discussion will not proceed along fundamental lines: instead of asking what we mean by artistic "meaning," we merely ask what critical approach best captures that meaning.

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{7}}\] Rhees (1969: 138).

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{8}}\] Hagberg appeals to the later Wittgenstein to attack a number of overlapping analogies that I will here simply dismiss as 'ismized' by labelling them, without any additional argument of my own, as forms of ineffabilism (ch1), cognitivism/idealism (ch2), experientialism (ch3), intentionalism/mentalism (ch4), correlativism (ch5), solipsism (ch6), and/or atomism (ch7).While these –isms shall variously feature in my own targets here, my main contention is with their wider common assumption that art is a language at all, at least not in any sense that isn’t utterly loose and empty (there isn’t a single philosophical proposition that isn’t true in some weird sense; the question is whether the sense in question is of any value).

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{9}}\] Hagberg (1995: 74).

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{10}}\] Hagberg (1995: 74).
Hagberg's critique of the assertion that 'art is the language of emotions' as concealing 'delicate falsehoods within unassailable truths' is good as far as it goes, but he nonetheless holds onto the thought that '[i]t is, and ought to be, and undeniable truth that art possesses meaning' (ibid). I wish to assail this assumption. Art no more has a meaning than lacks it. If having meaning is a matter of containing ideas, being about something, or there being something it is to understand a work of art qua art, as opposed to as a historical artefact, then of course one can understand that a painting is a painting in a particular genre, that a novel is set in a particular place and time, and so on, but none of this amounts to understanding the work of art itself. This is because there is no such thing as the correct understanding of even the most trivial work of art.  

This is not to rule out radical misunderstandings, or interpretational abuse. Art isn't meaningless, for it is a category mistake to say of a particular painting, jazz tune, or sculpted frieze that it either has or lacks a meaning. Does it follow that artworks cannot be understood or misunderstood? Appreciation certainly doesn't require understanding the meaning of anything. Failure to appreciate a wine, for instance, is not a failure to understand the wine itself. J.L. Austin writes:

The goldfinch cannot be assumed, nor the bread suppressed we may be deceived by the appearance of an oasis, or misinterpret the signs of the weather, but the oasis cannot lie to us and we cannot misunderstand the storm in the way we misunderstand the man.  

What of artworks? Are they more like people or storms? One can radically misunderstand a satire by taking it at face value or mistaking its intended target. But getting both of these things does not amount to understanding the artwork tout court. An artwork is not reducible to any ideas associated with it. Moreover, I may understand such ideas perfectly but just not get the artwork in question, because it does nothing for me; it doesn't speak to me even after I have made it talk.  

As with any object, vegetable, project, or even life itself, one can of course assign

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11 My critique here takes further the arguments is Hagberg (1995: chs. 2 & 3).
13 Austin (1979:112); cf. Grimm (2017). For a revisionary reading of Austin's original argument about knowledge of other minds that may be extended to cover aesthetic understanding see McMyler (2011: § 6).
14 Taylor (1970:264ff.) A promising alternative to Taylor's voluntaristic conception may be found in Wisdom (1959), discussed in the Epilogue below.
an artwork with genuine meaning; not justa personal meaning it might have for oneself\textsuperscript{15}, but a public one that can be shared. Such meaning is deeply intertwined with meaningfulness.\textsuperscript{16} But understanding is not a matter of correctly describing how things are, as if the existence of what is to be understood is entirely independently of our understanding of it. This is not to say that anything goes, but only that as G.E.R. Lloyd puts it, 'we should not assume at the outset that there is just one simple truth of the matter to be had, let alone one to which we happen to have exclusive access ourselves'.\textsuperscript{17} This should be distinguished from the much mistaken outlook that understanding art is a matter of finding one's own meanings and interpretations, commonly found in journalistic writing such as this:

\begin{quote}
[T]hinking about possible meanings [...] is a process of interpretation. It's not a science. It's not about finding the “right answers”, but about thinking creatively about the most plausible understandings of a work. The key here is context. The broader context of an artwork will help make sense of what you've already observed. Much of the information about context is usually given in those dull little labels that tell you the artist's name, the title of the work and the year. And there are often other valuable morsels of information included too, such as the place and year an artist was born.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Understanding art is not a matter of 'correct interpretation', for there is no fixed set of ideas to be found and understood in any artwork. If we are to talk of meaning here at all we must allow that new meanings may be acquired in time, leading to reevaluations.\textsuperscript{19} This is not anti-realism but a multi-layered pluralism that is compatible with 'the common pursuit' of true judgment.\textsuperscript{20} A Marxist reading of a book has value but not as providing the correct understanding of it.\textsuperscript{21} There are overlaps here with Joseph Margolis and Michael Krausz's multiplism (critical pluralism), which combines interpretive relativism with cultural realism.

\textsuperscript{15} See Ground (1989:66).
\textsuperscript{17} Lloyd (2012: 118; see also 101ff.).
\textsuperscript{18} Meshaum-Muir (2014).
\textsuperscript{19} For Leavis (1956), this is largely a matter of readjusting a work's place within the canon. Such refusal to set any evaluation in stone need not lapse into the postmodernist's perpetual deferral of meaning. Leavis' own proposal for an aesthetic judgement's \textit{entitlement} to universal assent takes a more Kantian routem as noted by Moyal-Sharrock (2016:§6).
\textsuperscript{20} Eliot (1923) & Leavis (1952).
\textsuperscript{21} Perhaps one can also give a Marxist reading of a person's life.
Margolis, however, treats the self as a sort of text, as opposed to merely being analogous to one:

We ourselves are texts, if we view ourselves—our thoughts and deeds—as the individuated expression of the internalized enabling structures of the larger culture in which we first emerge, are first formed, as the apt selves we are, apt for discovering how the language and practices of our society course through our every deed. In this sense, selves are the paradigmatic agents of linguistic and lingual uttering; also, metaphorically (historically), they “are” the legible utterances of their age: Goethe, Napoleon, Rousseau, Goya, for instance.22

But human beings are not texts of any kind, and to understand another person is not to understand a text. To understand another person – a matter of degree, not kind – is to know what makes them tick. To get how they think and feel about certain things and why. To be sure, some people are an open book whilst we don’t know how to read and at times even interpret the behaviour of others. By and large, however, we do not read otherd in even a metaphorical sense.

In earlier work, Margolis argues for a strong analogy between understanding people and understanding artworks.23 There is indeed a nice parallel between understand what someone says and what they write or, indeed, sculpt. Understanding what a person says, though, is not the same thing as understanding them. When Wittgenstein that if a lion could speak we could not understand it he doesn’t mean we couldn’t understand what the lion says (e.g. if it was speaking in English24), but that would not be able to understand why it would say such a thing, whether its speaker meaning coincided with the expression meaning of the sentences it utters, and so forth.25

Wittgenstein held that it was virtually impossible to understand another person. Not because of any metaphysical or epistemic barrier but because it is psychologically really hard to do so:

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23 Margolis (1980:44); cf. Hagberg (1995:180ff.) and Strawson (1966:202). If individual people are like art objects does that mean that identifiable groups ('The Dutch') are like art types ('The Dutch School')?
24 There is of course the difficulty of knowing whether the English-sounding phrases really were English, as we know it. Wittgenstein rightly thinks of the supposition that something can be a lion yet speak English is nonsense (see Sandis 2012:145-7).
25 See Sandis (2012:150ff) for how to understand the modality at hand.
The older I get the more I realize how terribly difficult it is for people to understand each other, and I think that what misleads one is the fact that they all look so much like each other. If some people looked like elephants and others like cats, or fish, one wouldn’t expect them to understand each other and things would look much more like what they really are. 

This is a postscript to a letter to the Italian Cambridge economist Pierro Sraffa, in which he writes:

In order to understand why it’s impossible, or almost impossible, for certain people to understand each other, one has to think not of the few occasions on which they meet, but of the differences of their whole lives; and there can be nothing more different than your interests and mine, and your movements of thought and mine.

Understanding others requires some degree of emergence into their form(s) of life, so that we may find our feet with them. Does understanding an artwork require the same? What would count as the artwork’s form of life? Rhees suggests that to understand any particular poem, ‘[y]ou have to know the life to which these remarks and phrases and expressions belong’. He is here referring to the practices and conventions of the genre:

What is said in a sonnet […] could not be said at all, unless there were other sonnets and other poems[…]It was possible for Drayton to write a great sonnet or a weak one because people were writing and have written poetry […] because poetry already had the relation to the rest of language which it did […]And if I had never seen or heard a poem in my life, then I’d not understand a great poem if you showed it to me […] I doubt if anyone has understood German poetry unless he knew German music; or French poetry without French painting.

But we need not accept Rhees’ surprisingly cognitivist framework to deny, as F.R. Leavis

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27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Rhees (1969:137). By contrast, ‘religious ideas are what the treatment in painting or in sculpture does to those themes. The ideas the work of art has are not ideas it received from religion. They are ideas it contributes to religion’ (Rhees 1969: 140).
does,\textsuperscript{31} that works of art as self-contained. To the limited extent that we may talk of understanding a piece of music, I can hear it for the first time and truly get it in a way in which no amount of scholarship can help with. There is a disanalogy here between understanding music and understanding that $2 + 2 = 4$ which, as Richard Wollheim puts it, 'may be self evident [...] but not to someone ignorant of what addition is'.\textsuperscript{32} There is a sharp contrast here between understanding artworks and understanding people. The analogy has got us so far, but can go no further.\textsuperscript{33} We are at a dead end.

II. On Not Getting it

On Rhees' view, there is a language of music, poetry, sculpture etc. (each with a variety of dialects), and to be able to understand a particular song or poem one must speak the language and be well-versed in the dialect. The view implies further that, like sentences, there is something that art works are about:

Art is serious in its 'ideas'. A piece of music is written in musical phrases or in music, as a poem is written in language and poetry [...] What is said in poetry cannot be said in ordinary speech, unless it is a bad poem [...] What is said in a sonnet (say Drayton's 'Since there's no help, come let us kiss and part') could not be said in any other form.\textsuperscript{34}

Rhees' account may be sub-divided into the following five theses:

1) Works of art can always be understood
2) To understand art is to understand its idea(s)
3) To understand its idea(s) is to understand what is said in the work of art
4) This cannot be said in ordinary speech
5) What is said in one artwork may not be said in any other form either e.g. using

\textsuperscript{31} See, for example, Leavis (1956, 1969, & 1974). For further criticism of cognitivist approaches see Hagberg (1995:ch. 2).
\textsuperscript{32} Wollheim (1968:89).
\textsuperscript{33} If it could, we could allow that while language can help with this, words often fail us. Indeed, as Weil (1959) and Murdoch (1992:281ff.) hint at, it frequently hinders understanding.
\textsuperscript{34} Rhees (1969:136-7); cf. Cooke (1959).
different (artistic) language.

For all his talk of inextricability, the view remains that there is something a novel or lyric says (or that an artist says with it) that is not identical to the words used to say it; something the artwork is about, which gives it its meaning.

Such ideas take us down the short but troubling road, from Claude Lévi-Strauss's Structural Anthropology (which seeks to crack he code of any narrative by uncovering the underlying structures of its elements)\(^{35}\) to A.J. Weberman's Dylanological Method (which claims to 'have cracked the enigma code of Dylan's lyrics\(^{36}\)). But the institutions of meaning are too holistically' bound up with the common practices that shape the way we act and talk' to be codifiable.\(^{37}\) There is no skeleton key to the kingdoms of meaning, there are no secret codes to crack.

The view that the language of art may be deciphered and translated is defended by Deryck Cooke:

> When we try to assess the achievement of a great literary artist, one of the chief ways in which we approach his [sic] work is to examine it as a report in human achievement. We feel that, in his art, he has *said* something significant in relation to life as it is lived; and that what he *has said* [...] is as important as the purely formal aspect of his writing. Or rather, these two main aspects of his art – 'content' and 'form' – are realized to be ultimately inseparable: what he *has said* is inextricably bound up with how he has said it.\(^{38}\)

Such is also the approach of Nelson Goodman, who argues that 'aesthetic experience is cognitive experience distinguished by the dominance of certain symbolic characteristics'.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{35}\) E.g. Lévi-Strauss (1958 & 1978).

\(^{36}\) Weberman (2005:ii).

\(^{37}\) Descombes (2014). Elsewhere, Descombes argues against the notational view of the novel as an 'art of language' in which we find Prousts' 'ideas' about life, about love, or about the world' (Descombes 1992:90ff.). Descombes embraces the pluralism of different readings/interpretations of a novel and argues against 'essentialist poetics' that' seek the essence of literature' (Ibid:93). If we differ on anything, it's that I wish to distance myself from the thought that the institutions of art are institutions of meaning, and the accompanying view (indebted to Dumont 1983) that human beings can themselves be institutions of this kind.

\(^{38}\) Cooke (1959: ix; my emphasis).

\(^{39}\) Goodman (1976:262).
Indeed, Goodman explicitly holds that we can quite literally *map* and decipher the languages of art, and Cooke aims to do just this to music:

[If we continually argue about the 'emotional content' of this or that composition – we should not therefore despair of ever finding an objective basis to work on. It may be that we have just not found a way of understanding this language, and that much of our interpretation of it is simply misinterpretation [...] This book is an attempt to bring music back from the intellectual-aesthetic limbo in which it is now lost [...] by beginning the task of actually deciphering its language. It attempts to show that the conception of music as a language capable of expressing certain very definite things is not a romantic aberration, but has been the unconscious assumption of composers for the past five-and-a-half centuries at least.]

Leaving aside problems regarding universal unconscious assumptions and the idea of *any* language remaining static enough to be decipherable, we should reject the claim about something definite being said by a particular composition, such that understanding it is a matter of unearthing what it is. Naturally, there are things about an artwork that one can understand (e.g. its theme, structure, and devices) but this would not be to understand it in the sense in which we can understand another human being.

To think that you cannot get a work of art unless you get what it is *about* is not to get art at all. Bob Dylan jests in this direction via an unlikely assimilation of Sartre and Douglas Adams:

Bob Dylan: It's not that it's so difficult to be unspecific and less obvious; it's just that there's nothing, absolutely nothing, to be specific and obvious *about*. My older songs, to say the least, were about nothing. The newer ones are about the same nothing – only as seen inside a bigger thing, perhaps called nowhere. But this is all very constipated. I do know what my song's are about.

Nat Hentoff: *And what's that?*

Bob Dylan: Oh, some are about four minutes; some are about five, and some, believe it or not, are about eleven.

His infamous San Francisco Television Press Conference, the year before (Dec 3, 1965) is a

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40 (Ibid:xii).
41 See Sandis (2012).
masterclass in deflecting questions of artistic meaning from the outset:

- What’s your new album about?
- Oh it's about, uh – just about all kinds of different things – rats, balloons. They’re about the only thing that comes to my mind right now.  

- *Your songs are supposed to have a subtle message.*
- Subtle message? [...] Where’d you hear that?
- *In a movie magazine*
- Oh my God! Well, we won’t – we won’t discuss those things here.  

The idea that all the songs to date or the last album might all be about one thing (constituting a concept album par excellence) is at once both preposterous and inviting:

*E*very song tails off with "Good luck – I hope you make it".  

The trappings of a more focused artistic intentionality are recognized by Jon Landau, writing about Dylan’s then newly released *John Wesley Harding* LP:

Dylan manifests a profound awareness of the war and how it is affecting all of us [...] This doesn’t mean that I think any of the particular songs are about the war or that any of the songs are protests over it’. All I mean to say is that Dylan has felt the war, that there is an awareness of it contained within the mood of the album as a whole.  

Even Dylan would not deny that if you might write a commissioned sonnet *about* your grandmother and that this might turn out to also be about mortality. But does this aboutness exhaust its meaning? Does it exhaust our understanding of the sonnet? And if one doesn’t know it is about your grandmother, do they fail to understand it? When Bob Dylan sings ‘you’ve got a lot of nerve to say you are my friend’ or ‘a hard rain's a gonna fall’ there may have been an original person or event that motivated him to write the lines. But

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43 Ibid (65).
44 Ibid (66).
46 Landau (1968).
47 For why the intention constraint on representation makes little difference to aesthetics see Wollheim (1968: 35ff.).
by the time the song is finished, this initial cause need not mean that the song is about something so specific. In time he may forget what motivated it, does he thereby cease to understand his own song? \footnote{Does the song change every time that Dylan updates a line or tune? Theorists will wish to wheel in their favoured accounts of aesthetic metaphysics at this point. But life is too short to have endless debates on the nature of artworks about questions whose answer is surely 'in one sense yes, and in another no' (see also Gallie 1955).}

What would count as a full or even adequate understanding of something? The question forms part of a more general puzzle of circularity that many gallery and museum curators face: the viewer’s understanding of any given object is typically dependent upon the expert knowledge of the curator, archaeologist, anthropologist, ethnographer, or other with expert knowledge of the objects themselves. Yet the artefacts themselves will inevitably be part of the evidence for understanding other cultures. The only way forward involves a reflective equilibrium between our knowledge of the objects we discover and that of the social context in-and-for which they were originally created and used. These two areas of knowledge and understanding are epistemically interdependent: a re-assessment of either will alter our perspective of the other. \footnote{See Sandis (2014).} This much is true of artworks and artefacts \textit{qua} historical objects. But their appreciation \textit{qua} art works cuts loose from such concerns. \footnote{In this I am diametrically opposed to those who claim that ‘[t]o appreciate particular works [of art] we need some understanding of their background’ (Pole 1973:152). For a populist application of this approach see Schama (2006); cf. Sandis (2017c).}

Does understanding what an artist produces require that we understand the artist ‘behind the work’? Attempts to understand the artwork through the artist are mirrored by attempts to understand artist through the artwork. This trouble disappears upon the abandonment of the notion that understanding an artwork is a matter of understanding the ideas which the artist seeks to communicate, a view which would literally transform all art into conceptual art. Nothing in art is hidden. And yet, understanding what an intelligible critic says about a work of art is still a far cry from sharing in their understanding of it.

\textbf{III. Transport Studies}

Contemporary philosophy leaves little space for a theory of understanding that is distinct
from the theories of knowledge and explanation. This is partly due to the assumption, found in Locke among others, that understanding another is a matter of obtaining information about their mind:

[T]houghts can’t be laid open to the immediate view of anyone else, or stored anywhere but in the memory which isn’t a very secure repository, we need signs for our ideas so as to communicate our thoughts to one another and record them for our own use. The signs that men have found most convenient, and therefore generally make use of, are articulate sounds [...] the great instruments of knowledge.

But is this true? It helps to here compare the understanding of others to self-understanding. The traditional view that understanding oneself is a matter of acquiring information or knowledge via some kind of privileged introspective access to the ‘contents’ of our own minds is deeply implausible. Self-understanding is inseparable from our relationships to the people, objects, and institutions that make up our world. Hence the common phenomenon of better understanding oneself after one has lost something that was an integral part of one's life e.g. one's job, child, reputation, abilities, property, dreams, and ambitions.

As with self-understanding, the understanding of others comes from a shared communion which cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge. Eleanor Stump argues that the experiential knowledge of persons is transmitted through stories. I remain more sceptical about the truth value of the narratives we deliver. Autobiography reveals how our attempts to understand are inextricably tied to the desire to conceive of our lives as having purpose and direction. While these may produce the feeling of understanding, we have overwhelming reason to mistrust the tales we spin to ourselves, which is not to deny that we may comprehend ourselves better by reading old letters, diaries, and the like.

While still dominant, the Lockean notion of understanding as the obtaining of information of some kind has also been attacked by Stanley Cavell:

Talking together is acting together, not making motions and noises at one another, not transferring

51 See Hertzberg (2005) for the relation of (different sense of) understanding to both knowledge and explanation.
52 Locke (1700: Bk. IV, § 5).
54 Stump (2010).
unspeakable messages or essences from the inside of one closed chamber to the inside of another.\textsuperscript{55}

G.H. R. Parkinson dismisses the view of understanding that follows from Locke's theory of communication as 'the translation theory of understanding'. In a paper with that same title\textsuperscript{56}, and Timothy G. Potts likens the model of meaning communication that falls out of it as 'a branch of transport studies' in which ideas are transported from one person's mind to another via sentences or art that is encoded into a common language by the speaker or artist and decoded back into that of the hearer or observer.\textsuperscript{57} Potts nevertheless accepts that sounds carry messages and perhaps he would say the same of artworks too. But if an artwork carried a message in this sense it would have to be be the sort of fanciful secret message hypothesized about in novels like the Dan Brown's \textit{The Da Vinci Code}. Granted such thing are possible, but such codes would not give us \textit{the meaning} of the artwork in question any more than a Bible referred to by spies speaking in code may be said to carry the meaning of their exchanges.\textsuperscript{58}

This view has recently resurged in standard contemporary accounts of empathy as a kind of emotional tool which provides one with an access-pass to people’s ‘mental contents’, which in turn double as their motivating reasons\textsuperscript{59} and related views about the communicative intention of art.\textsuperscript{60} But getting a musical form such as punk rock, jazz, or blues (let alone any work that subverts recognizable boundaries) is not a matter of understanding communicable propositions about the work or its creators and environment, no matter how much empathy one may be trying to employ. This is not to say that a song may not communicate any ideas to its listeners, including the one mentioned in the previous sentence, as hinted at by Dylan when he tells Mr Jones that he's 'been through all of F. Scott

\textsuperscript{55} Cavell (1969:33-4),

\textsuperscript{56} Parkinson (1977).

\textsuperscript{57} Potts (1977:92). See also Stewart (1977), Vesey (1977: ix-xxxi), and Hagberg (1995:66-7). For the effects of this view of on the semiotics of understanding and translating poetry see Jakobson (1959) and Steiner (1975:261).

\textsuperscript{58} See also Hagberg (1995: Ch. 5) for further criticism.

\textsuperscript{59} See the essays in Coplan & Goldie (2011).

\textsuperscript{60} Currie (2014: Ch. 6)
Fitzgerald’s books’ but doesn’t know what is happening here.  But if ‘understanding a song’ amounts to anything at all, it won’t be a list of such ideas.

One could read everything there is to know about Jazz and still not get it. The situation may seem analogous to that of Mary in Jackson’s famous example of the expert on the neurophysiology of colour who lives in a black and white room. Factual knowledge is indeed not sufficient for understanding. But this is not because what is missing is phenomenal knowledge, be it understood informationally or otherwise. Getting jazz (or death metal, or whatever) is no simple matter of having a certain experience when its played. It’s about sharing an aesthetic sensibility with others. It may be described in words, but they won’t help a person lacking it to get it.

There are ways in, of course. Greil Marcus’ *Invisible Republic* helps the reader to get Bob Dylan and The Band’s *Basement Tapes* by pontificating on Americana. This is no expiriential replacement for listening to the music, but what one gets by listening to the *The Basement Tapes* is not phenomenal knowledge of what it is like to do so but all sorts of nods, tributes, allusions, subtleties, plays on words, aspirations, and values: a whole world that cannot be reduced to either information or ‘qualia’. If there is any thing (or range of things) that it is like to listen to these songs, it will be the sort of thing captured by Marcus. If anything is said in *The Basement Tapes*, if the work contains ideas of any kind, then they can be conveyed in books such as *Invisible Republic*. Rhees is committed to denying the very possibility of this. On his view, something is said in the Mona Lisa, but nobody can say what it is in either ordinary speech or some other piece of art.

Rhees also denies that understanding amounts to factual knowledge, but only because he maintains that while to understand art is to understand the ideas behind (‘what is said in’) it, one cannot convey what is understood by any other means. Accordingly, when he talks of understanding the idea(s) in a work of art he doesn’t hold that this reduces to being able to repeat facts about what these ideas are. He remains committed, however, to

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61 Dylan (1965). The chorus is most probably an echo of Mark Strand’s ‘something is happening that you can’t figure out’ (Strand 1964), itself a tribute to Albert Arnold Scholl (1957), though such trivia does not help one to understand Dylan’s song.

62 Jackson (1986).

63 For a Wittgensteinian understanding of experience reports see Hacker (2012).

64 Rhees (1969:166-8).
there being such fixed ideas and to one's grasp of these amounting to understanding the work of art in question.

To be sure, experiencing Jazz is necessary to getting it, but it is not sufficient. Moreover, there is no one thing it is like to listen to some particular piece of blues, jazz, or punk, let alone to any piece that fits the genre. *A fortiori*, understanding jazz cannot be the same as knowing what it is like to listen to it. But nor is the understanding ineffable.65 Two people can have a conversation about what is great about a new album and understand one another perfectly. But they have to both already be in the know. As with uncodifiable moral perception, no amount of propositions can get you there; experience can make the difference, but there are no guarantees. K.W. Britton captures aesthetic attunement well:

The understanding may not use words, there may not even be any conscious process: simply an appropriate response. To be able to interpret symbols in some way or other is to have some understanding of life.66

Neither understanding nor communication is reducible to the acquisition of new facts. There is a difference between understanding the words a speaker has said, and understanding the speaker – understanding the 'why' as well as the 'what'. Wittgenstein states that 'if a lion could talk, we could not understand it', not because of any insurmountable language barrier, but because we wouldn’t know what it was aiming to do with its words. We need to free ourselves from approaching communication as something geared towards the transmission of information. In the case of aesthetics this involves a rejection of the supposition that the meaning of a work of art is whatever the author intended to communicate with it, and that to understand this work of art is to understand this meaning; an old chestnut in a new fire.

**IV. Meaning, Intention, and all that Jazz**

Hagberg rescues the innocuous view that a work of art may have been produced with certain intentions from the perilous theory that these must have at some (prior or

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65 See Hagberg (1995:8-22). Moore (1997) holds that certain kinds of understanding (e.g. religious) amount to practical knowledge of how to show things that cannot be said. By contrast, I have been emphasizing that we can say what we have understood and yet fail to communicate it.

66 Britton (1977:221), who disappointingly thinks of works of art in terms of *symbols*.
concerning meaning, intention, and action share C who both view artworks as actions of some kind, whereas I view them as contrasted with those of Gregory Currie (1989:46-84 & 2004: Ch.6) and Dennis Dutton (2009:47ff) who both view artworks as actions of some kind, whereas I view them as the products of action (I share Currie’s conviction that aesthetics should be informed by much more general questions concerning meaning, intention, and action, but we do not agree in any of these areas).

Elsewhere, I have argued that artistic intention is only relevant to the appreciation of the artistic process, but not its product. At most, aesthetic appreciation of the artistic product requires that we see it as such, though the postmodern embrace of Cecilia Giemez’s infamous ‘monkey mural’ botching of Elias Garcia Martinez’s fresco Ecce Home suggests that the possibility of unintentional art is not to be dismissed too easily. If the aesthetic relevance of the process/product distinction is as I maintain it to be, Hagberg’s points will need to be translated into points about art qua doing rather than thing done. I don’t wish to dwell on this distinction here, but to push his proposal further in two additional directions. First, we must distinguish the artist’s meaning from artistic meaning just as we distinguish speaker meaning from expression and utterance meaning. Second, whatever the role of intention may be there is the separate question of whether what is understood is an idea of some kind and, indeed, whether there be something it is to

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67 Hagberg 1995 (79).
68 Ibid (84).
69 I discuss the latter in Sandis (2010) in relation to the debates between McDowell (2009) and Pippin (2010) on retrospective accounts of intention. For the parallel debate in relation to artistic intention and ‘what is there’ to be seen see Cavell (1969:230ff.) Cavell’s radical conclusion is that ‘[t]he artist is responsible for everything that happens in his work – and not just in the sense that it is done, but in the sense that it is meant (Ibid: 237). The other side of this coin is that ‘[i]n the land he has made, the artist is entitled to everything he wants, if it’s there’ (Ibid:233).
70 Sandis (2017a&b), in which I tackle Livingstone (2005) and Uidhir (2013). My account may be contrasted with those of Gregory Currie (1989:46-84 & 2004: Ch.6) and Dennis Dutton (2009:47ff) who both view artworks as actions of some kind, whereas I view them as the products of action (I share Currie’s conviction that aesthetics should be informed by much more general questions concerning meaning, intention, and action, but we do not agree in any of these areas).
71 Cf. Ground (1989:29ff.)
understand a work of art at all. I have been less ready to answer this question positively than Hagberg, though if I did we would be in agreement that – as with people – such an understanding would not reduce to knowledge of any propositional content.  

You aim to draw a duck but you inadvertently draw a duck-rabbit. Are we to deny that this is what you have drawn? Oedipus similarly loses control over what he does. His deeds break free from his intentions, he ‘learns what he has done from the way things turn out’. This wedge between intention and action is always there; it is no different in the case of art. Does that mean that the artist might not get their own work? They certainly may have been blind to certain aspects of it that were there to be seen – to be gotten

The point is neither to reveal the hidden secret of Oedipus nor to add one more interpretation to the good-enough pile, but to invite one to see something which is right there in the text.

Is to understand a work of art to understand its meaning and be able to give an answer equivalent to that requested by the British Bobby who asks ‘what is the meaning of all this then?’ For me, Borges’ stories and Chekhov’s are comedic to the core, but I have a friend who insists that they are deeply tragic. Must either one of us have failed to understand them? And what if I sometimes see them as funny and other as tragic, depending on my mood?

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72 Hagberg (1994) does this by appealing to four stories by William James through the lens of Wittgenstein’s language games.

73 I discuss the latter in Sandis (2010) in relation to the debates between Pippin (2010) and McDowell (2009) on Hegel’s allegedly retrospective account of intention. For the parallel debate in relation to artistic intention and ‘what is there’ to be seen see Cavell (1969:230ff.) Cavell’s radical conclusion is that ‘[t]he artist is responsible for everything that happens in his work – and not just in the sense that it is done, but in the sense that it is meant (Ibid: 237). The other side of this coin is that ‘[i]n the land he has made, the artist is entitled to everything he wants, if it’s there’ (ibid:233).

74 Sandis (2017c:218).

75 Lear (1998:39); see also note 81 above. The difference between seeing something that is right there and interpreting it is complicated by the related distinction between Wollheim’s Seeing-In and Wittgenstein’s Seeing-As, which, among other things, arguably contains an objective/subjective distinction (see essays in Kemp & Mras 2016).

76 This is quite different from Woody Allen’s Melinda and Melinda, in which the same story outline is fleshed out in two different ways, as opposed to the exact same narrative being read in diametrically opposed ways.
These and other problems in aesthetics cannot be divorced from questions central to the philosophy of action, of which speech-act theory is ultimately subset. Perhaps the most relevant is the theory of communication and understanding. The Lockean conception of understanding as the obtaining of relevant information has found new life in the empathy industry, Information and Communications Technology,\textsuperscript{77} neuro-aesthetics, and worse. But just as new facts about people can render them more confusing, so too with art. Aesthetic understanding is not a matter of understanding any ideas that an artwork contains. A fortiori, information about the artist's life and intentions is as likely to bafflement as it is to understanding, and any understanding it might manage to provide will be to the artistic process rather than the artwork itself.

I have attempted to show that Lockean approaches to understanding systematically neglect crucial aspects of our experience of art. To maintain that understanding art is a matter of learning a bunch of facts about the artist and her milieu is to just not get it. To imagine that there must always be some thing to understand and that this involves knowledge of an idea is to render all art into conceptual art.

\textit{Epilogue}

John Wisdom, writing about the meaning of life, asserts that 'when we ask "what is the meaning of all things?"' we 'cannot answer such a question in the form: "The meaning is this"' for 'what one calls answering such a question is not giving an answer.'\textsuperscript{78} Might the same be true of the meaning of an artwork? Wisdom invites us to consider the following scenario:

Imagine that we come into a theatre after a play has started and are obliged to leave before it ends. We may then be puzzled by the part of the play that we were able to see. We may ask "What does it mean?" in this case we want to know what went before and what came after in order to understand the part we saw. But sometimes even when we have seen and heard a play from the beginning to the end we are still puzzled and still ask what does the whole thing mean. In this case we are not asking what came before or what came after, we are not asking about anything outside the play itself. We are, if you like, asking a very different question from what we usually put with the words "What does

\textsuperscript{77} Sandis (2016d).
\textsuperscript{78} Wisdom (1965: 41).
this mean?" But we are still asking a real question, we are still asking a question which has sees and is not absurd. For our words express a wish to grasp the character, the significance of the whole play [...] Is the play a tragedy, a comedy or a tale told by an idiot?\(^79\)

Wisdom's conclusion is that life has a meaning that cannot be listed, but is not ineffable either:

When we ask what is the meaning of this play or this picture we cannot express the understanding which this question may lead to in the form of a list of just those things in the play or the picture which give it its meaning. No. The meaning eludes such a list. This does not mean that words quite fail us. They may yet help us provided that we do not expect of them more than they can do.\(^80\)

One may get or fail to get an artwork or individual work of art. This can only ever amount to understanding if this allows for a plurality if incommensurable – and at times contradictory – things to be understood. There is no such thing as understanding the meaning of an artwork. To the extent that we can talk of understanding art at all, this is not a matter of being able to list the ideas that it contains, or the topics it is ostensibly about. But nor is aesthetic understanding a matter of attuning oneself to the ineffable. If an artwork could speak, we could not understand it.\(^81\)

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\(^79\) Wisdom (1965: 40); cf. note 86 above. Wisdom is, of course, making analogies between theatre and life, and the allusion is to Macbeth's words upon hearing from Seyton that Lady Macbeth has died: 'Life [...] is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing' (Macbeth, Act 5, Scene 5).

\(^80\) Wisdom (1965: 41).

\(^81\) For very helpful comments and conversations I would like to thank Hanne Appelqvist, Louise Chapman, Víctor Dura-Vila, Garry Hagberg, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Luke Mulhall, Lilian O'Brien, Michael Proudfoot, Catherine Rowett, and the organizer and participants of the 51st session of the *Welsh Philosophical Society* at Gregynog Hall (2015), in which we discussed Rush Rhees' paper 'Art and Philosophy', presented by Anniken Greve.

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